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A Widow's Might: Nakaya v. Japan and Japan's 
Current State of Religious Freedom 
I. INTRODUCTION 
fl 
While the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still 
settling, the Japanese, trying to come to terms with their first 
military defeat in recorded history, suffered yet another blow to 
their national identity: On New Year's Day, 1946, Emperor 
Hirohito publicly denounced his divinity. Because the then 
state religion, Shinto, deemed the Emperor to be a direct 
descendant of the gods as well as the spiritual and political 
leader of the country, the reverberations from this 
announcement shook the already devastated Japanese 
populace.' With the religious implications of t he  
announcement came significant social and political changes. 
Prior to this time, religion and state in Japan had been 
united through the imperial throne, and Japanese culture 
reflected this merger. The Emperor's announcement, along with 
political and legal restructuring effected by occupational forces, 
created a legal separation between religion and the state that 
had never before existed in Japanese society. The less formal, 
cultural union of the Shinto religion and the Japanese state 
was not so easily dismissed, however, and it continues to 
influence both the popular and public concepts of separation of 
church and state and religious freedom in Japan. 
1. Although most Japanese today do not regard the Emperor to be a 
descendent of the gods, many still display a sentimental loyalty to the throne, and 
some retain their belief in the Emperor's divinity. Hideaki Kase, an author on the 
Japanese Imperial Family, is not untypical of this group. In reference to the 
current Emperor he has stated the following: "The English term 'emperor' is too 
broad. He is a priest-king, the highest ranking Shintoist priest, half-god, half-man." 
When confronted with the fact that the Emperor conceded that he was not divine, 
Kase has responded 'Yes . . . but at  American gunpoint. Suppose your God in 
heaven was declared no longer God. Tennou [the Emperor] is still sacred. He is a 
holy man, a shaman." Nina J. Easton, Shinto Meets Chanel: An Imperial Family 
Steeped in Tradition Searches for a Clear Identity as Japan Struggles to Update 
the Myth of its Chrysanthemum Throne, L.A. TZMES MAG., June 6, 1993, at  16, 53 
(quoting Hideaki Kase). 
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This Comment focuses on religious freedom and the 
separation of church and state within the context of Japanese 
society, emphasizing the Japanese Supreme Court's decision in 
Nakaya v. Japan.2 In that case, the Japanese Supreme Court 
held that a government agency that had facilitated the Shinto 
enshrinement of the remains of a Christian woman's deceased 
husband against her will did not violate the Japanese 
Constitution's religious guarantee. Japan's minority religions 
almost universally oppose the court's decision. Some see the 
ruling as a subtle governmental endorsement of Shinto as the 
state religion, others see it as a step down the path to a 
resurgent Japanese militarism. 
As a background for understanding the role of religion and 
state in Japan, Part I1 of this Comment will provide a brief 
overview of Japan's religious foundations and the basic tenets 
of Shinto, focusing on its influences on the Japanese 
sociological and political framework. It will also briefly discuss 
the origins of the Constitution of Japan and outline its 
religious guarantees. Part I11 will discuss the Tsu City case, 
the first Japanese Supreme Court decision to address the issue 
of constitutional religious freedoms and the precursor to 
Nakaya. Part IV will then analyze the Japanese Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Nakaya. Part V will discuss Nakaya in 
light of current American analysis of religious freedom 
jurisprudence. Finally, Part VI will discuss the possible effects 
of Nakaya on Japanese religious freedoms, discussing the 
difficulties of its application in modem Japanese culture and 
examining potential pitfalls that must be avoided in order to 
ensure the maintenance of religious freedoms in Japan. 
A. A Brief History of Japan and Shinto 
The history of Shinto is essentially the history of Japan 
itself, for out of Shinto arose the modern idea of much of what 
is Japanese. According to ancient Shinto legend, Japan was 
founded in 660 B.C. by Jimmu Tennou, a great grandson of the 
2. Judgment of June 1, 1988, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshuu 277 
(Japan). For the benefit of English readers, the remainder of citations to the case 
will refer to the following English translation: Judgment on the Enshrinement of a 
Dead SDF OfFcer to Gokoku Shrine, 25 SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT UPON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 1 (1991) [hereinafter 
Judgment on the Enshrinement]. 
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Sun Goddess, Amaterasu. The lineage of emperors is said to 
descend directly from Jimmu ten no^;^ thus Japanese emper- 
ors are considered divine.' The islands of Japan were also con- 
sidered to be of divine origin, created and protected by the 
gods? Such ancient folklore defines the historical traditions 
and much of the modern culture of Japan. 
Shinto has been described by one scholar as "a crude form 
of polytheism, combined with animism, or nature ~ o r s h i p . " ~  
Under the philosophy of Shinto, there exist a myriad of gods. 
For example, there is a god (kami) for each city and village. 
Oftentimes, special waterfalls, rocks, trees, and other objects 
are also given the title of kami. 
Ancestor worship is another important aspect of Shinto. 
This practice-of particular importance in this Comment-is 
thought to have been introduced into Shinto philosophy over 
1000 years ago, possibly through the influence of the Chine~e.~  
Shinto places special emphasis on deceased imperial ancestors 
and tribal deities who are considered to be gods and who are 
worshipped at Shinto shrines dedicated to their memory? This 
view of the spiritual world and of Japan's origins has been 
deeply ingrained in Japanese culture from early on,' thus 
3. Jimmu Tennou is considered by most scholars to have been an actual 
historical figure. 
4. See ROBERT K. REISCHAUER, EARLY JAPANESE HISTORY 109-115 (1967). 
The title Tennou is still used to address the emperor of Japan. 
5. According to ancient Japanese records, the islands of Japan were created 
when the gods of heaven commanded a male god named Izanagi and a female god 
named Izanami to create a new land. The legend maintains that they reached 
down fiom heaven and dipped a jewelled spear into the ocean. When they with- 
drew it, the muddy soil that dripped down from its tip formed an island. Izanagi 
and Izanami are then said to have descended from heaven to this island, from 
which they procreated the other islands of Japan, becoming its first inhabitants. 
See KOJIKI [RECORD OF ANCIENT THINGS], bk. I, chs. 1-11 (712 A.D.), translated in 
KO= 47-70 (Donald L. Philippi, trans., 1969); NIHON SHOKI [CHRONICLES OF JA- 
PAN] bk. I, pt. I (720 AD.), translated in NIHONGI 1-28 W.G. Aston, trans., new 
ed. 1972); REISCHAUER, supra note 4, at 107. 
6. MALCOLM KENNEDY, A SHORT HISTORY OF JAPAN 22 (1963). 
7. Id.; see also H .  PAUL VARLEY, JAPANESE CULTURE 18-21 (3d ed. 1984). 
8. This practice of ancestor worship differs somewhat &om common Buddhist 
practice in Japan. The most common form of ancestor worship in most forms of 
Japanese Buddhism focuses on the worship of specific, usually recently deceased, 
ancestors whose remains are placed in a butsudan or Buddhist altar kept in the 
home of the deceased's relatives. 
9. For example, ancient stories speak "of Jimmu Tennou worshiping his 
ancestor the Sun Goddess in his palace," which is thought to have been a "crude 
wooden structure," serving the multiple purposes of imperial residence, center of 
government, and religious shrine. KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 23; see also KAREL 
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shaping the culture and mind-set of Japan. 
While Shinto was closely associated with Japanese culture 
and government *om its beginnings, it was not until the 1880s 
that they made their most notorious merger. As the Japanese 
feudal system began to decline, the imperial family was pro- 
moted as the new rallying point for the loyalties of the people. 
Political leaders and scholars promulgated a new constitution 
in 1889,'~ establishing the Emperor as the spiritual and politi- 
cal head of state." With this shift in power, a new form of 
Shinto emerged. Elevated to the position of official state reli- 
gion and "remodeled" to include ultra-nationalist teachings and 
the Japanese warrior code of conduct," State Shinto was des- 
ignated as a code of national ethics and rituals, and the Shinto 
VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 274 (1989). 
10. Now referred to as the Meiji Constitution. 
11. The first portion of the imperial oath read: 
We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do 
humbly and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to 
Our other Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-ex- 
tensive with the Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and 
secure from decline the ancient form of government. 
MEIJI KENPOU [Meiji Constitution] Imperial Oath sworn in the Sanctuary in the 
Imperial Palace (Japan 1889), in COUNT H. ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU- 
TION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (M. Ito trans., 1889), reprinted in THE JAPANESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1977) [hereinafter TANAKA]. Articles 1 to 4 of 
Chapter I of the Meiji Constitution read: 
ARTICLE 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by 
a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. 
ARTICLE 2. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male 
descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law. 
ARTICLE 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable. 
ARTICLE 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Him- 
self the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provi- 
sions of the present Constitutions. 
Id. at  18. The actual power and influence of the Emperor during this era is still 
somewhat debatable and the actual extent of his influence may never be known. 
Most scholars, however, appear to think that the Emperor functioned more as a 
figurehead and a facade for the actions of government officials than as an autono- 
mous military dictator. 
12. Known in Japanese as bushidou. This warrior code includes the Japanese 
caste system and undying obedience to feudal lord and country. Most readers will 
be familiar with the practice of harakiri or seppuku, which is the ritual of killing 
oneself by disembowelment in order to atone, for example, for disgracing one's lord 
or honor. This was commonly practiced by those warriors (samurai) who had lost 
an important battle or had committed some other serious violation of their code of 
honor. The inclusion of many of these warrior class doctrines into the state version 
of Shinto served to promote an extremely strong sense of nationalism. See, e.g., 
JOHN ALLYN, THE 47 RONIN STORY (1970); HERMAN OOMS, TOKUGAWA IDEOLOGY 
(1985). 
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beliefs regarding the creation and supremacy of Japan were 
taught as unquestionable historical truth.13 
This shift set the country on a course that would lead to its 
military aggression in World War I1 and culminate in defeat 
and surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945. Upon defeat, Japan 
was placed under the control of the Allied Forces and was re- 
quired to rewrite the Meiji constitution to address issues in- 
cluding human rights, the political supremacy of the Emperor, 
and the wide-ranging effects of state Shinto." The Allied 
Forces rejected the first draR, which was prepared by the Japa- 
nese, stating that it was "wholly unacceptable . . . as a docu- 
ment of freedom and derno~racy."'~ Under the direction of 
General MacArthur, a handful of American lawyers prepared 
their own draft? This American draft became the foundation 
of the current Japanese constitution." Among other radical 
changes, this new Japanese constitution sought to clearly di- 
vide militaristic state Shinto from the operations of the newly 
reorganized government." The Japanese Government estab- 
13. KENNEDY, supra note 6, a t  15, 154. This was accomplished through com- 
pulsory curriculum in all public schools. 
14. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 111-13, 122-24 (1992); see also Sugata 
Masaaki, Shinto Resurgence, 15 JAPAN Q. 365 (1988) (providing an overview of 
modern Shinto sects and their relations to state Shinto). 
15. KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 17 (1991) (quoting 1 
NIHONKOKU KENPOU SEITEI-NO KATEI [THE MAKING OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITU- 
TION] 322 (Takayanagi Kenzou et al. eds., 1972)); see also ODA, supm note 14, a t  
112. The Japanese draft took approximately half of its articles directly from the 
Meiji Constitution. It also retained the Emperor as the political head of the coun- 
try, thus falling far short of the Allied Forces' democratic expectations. INOUE, 
supra, a t  9-16. 
16. This group consisted of Courtney Whitney, chief of the 'Government Sec- 
tion who was assigned to direct the constitutional reformation, and three members 
of his staff: Col. Charles L. Kades, Lt. Col. Milo E. Rowell, and Comdr. Alfred R. 
Hussey. INOUE, supra note 15, a t  16. The Allied Occupation Forces considered 
Article Twenty, which deals with the role of religion in the Japanese state, to be 
one of the more crucial aspects of the new constitution. Reacting to the Emperor's 
complete control of both religious and governmental activities during World War 11, 
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers enforced a strong policy of separa- 
tion of church and state during the postwar occupation. ODA, supm note 14, a t  
123. See genemlly WIIU.AM P. WOODARD, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 1945- 
1952 AND JAPANESE RELIGIONS (1972). 
17. For more information on the history of the Constitution of Japan, see 
INOUE, supra note 15; TETSWA KATAOKA, THE PRICE OF A CONSTITUTION: THE 
ORIGIN OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR P O m c S  (1991); ODA, supm note 14, a t  32-34, 111-15 
(1992); TANAKA, supm note 11, a t  642-85. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23; YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUC~~ON 
TO JAPANESE LAW 196-97 (Anthony H. Angelo ed. & trans., 1976). For a compre- 
hensive discussion of the development, revision, and adoption of the religion clauses 
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lished the Constitution of Japan (Kenpou) on May 3, 1947." 
B. The Japanese Constitution's Religious Guarantees 
The Constitution of Japan rejected several of the principles 
of the prior Meiji Constitution. One of the more notable chang- 
es, Article Twenty, provided an express guarantee of religious 
freedom: 
(1) Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor 
exercise any political authority. 
(2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any 
religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. 
(3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious 
education or any other religious activity.20 
Paragraph three is commonly referred to as the Institutional 
Guarantee. Together with the second sentence of paragraph 
one, it strongly implies that there shall be a clear separation of 
church and ~ t a t e . ~ '  The first sentence of paragraph one and 
the sentence comprising paragraph two of Article Twenty pro- 
vide for the fiee exercise of religion.22 The language of the 
Constitution of Japan is much more specific than that of the 
United States.23 This is undoubtedly due to the American 
drafters' fears of a possible reunification of Shinto with the 
in the Constitution of Japan, see INOUE, supm note 15, a t  104-59. 
19. For an insight into the events involved in drafting the current Constitu- 
tion of Japan, see TANAKA, supra note 11, a t  653-64. 
20. KENPOU [Constitution] ch. 111, art. 20, 1 3 (Japan), in TANAKA, supra note 
11, at  6. For an introduction to the making of this constitution and the accompa- 
nying political maneuvers of both the Allied Forces and the Japanese, see id. a t  
642-64. 
21. Paragraph Three is analogous to the Establishment Clause of the United 
States Constitution, which states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
22. In the two religious cases decided by the Japanese Supreme Court under 
this constitution, these two sentences were analyzed together. These sentences are 
analogous to the United States' Free Exercise Clause which states: "Congress shall 
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Id. 
23. The specificity of the Japanese Constitution's religious guarantees might 
imply that the Japanese Supreme Court is allowed comparatively less freedom of 
interpretation than its counterpart in the United States. However, because the 
Japanese Supreme Court has only reviewed two cases under this Article (Sekiguchi 
v. Suminaga (The Tsu City case), Judgment of July 13, 1977, Saikousai [Supreme 
Courtl, 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan); and Nakaya v. Japan, Judgment of June 1, 1988, 
Saikousai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshuu 277 (Japan)), the extent of the court's 
interpretative powers remains to be seen. 
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Japanese State. Thus, the Constitution of Japan seems to man- 
date a complete separation of church and state in modern Ja- 
pan. 
The Japanese Supreme Court has only interpreted Article 
Twenty on two occasions. Accordingly, the two cases addressing 
the Article weigh heavily on the future of religious freedom in 
Japan. The first case to address Article Twenty was Sekiguchi 
v. S ~ r n i n a g a . ~ ~  More than a decade later, the Supreme Court 
addressed Article Twenty again in Nakaya v. Japan.25 
The Japanese Supreme Court first interpreted Article 
Twenty of the Japanese Constitution in 1977, nearly three 
decades after the constitution's adoption, in Sekiguchi v. 
Suminaga, a decision commonly referred to as the "Tsu City" 
case. In 1965, the City of Tsu held a j i ~ h i n s a i ~ ~  when it com- 
menced construction of a new municipal gy~nnasium.~~ Seiichi 
Sekiguchi, a Communist member of the Tsu City C o u n ~ i l , ~ ~  
filed suit against the Mayor, charging that both the fees paid to 
four Shinto priests for the jichinsai and the City's endorsement 
of the ritual violated Article Twenty of the Constitution of Ja- 
pan.29 After a verdict in favor of the city in the Tsu District 
Court, the Nagoya High Court reversed in favor of the plain- 
tiff.30 
24. Judgment of July 13, 1977, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 
(Japan). 
25. Judgment of June 1, 1988, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 42 Minshuu 277 
(Japan). 
26. A jichinsai is a Shinto ceremony performed to purify and dedicate a 
building site and to ensure the safety of construction workers. 
27. Judgment of July 13, 1977, 31 Minshuu at 533; see also TANAKA, supra 
note 11, at  735. 
28. According to research by Keiichi Yanagawa and David Reid, most reli- 
gious organizations in Japan can be classified as favoring a certain relation be- 
tween Japanese religion and government. They suggest that groups tending to 
prefer a policy of religious tolerance coupled with wide separation from government 
activities include Joudo Shinshuu (a relatively modem, "reformist" Buddhist group), 
the vast majority of Christians, and members of the many "new religions" currently 
forming in Japan. Japanese Communists and members of other political and social 
minorities are also generally considered to be part of this diverse group. See 
Keiichi Yanagawa & David Reid, Between Unity and Separation: Religion and Poli- 
tics in Japan, 1965-1977, 6 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS TUD. 500, 504-08 (1979). 
29. See TANAKA, supra note 11, at  735; Yanagawa & Reid, supra note 28, at  
500, 512. 
30. Judgment of May 14, 1971, Nagoya Kousai [Nagoya High Court], 630 
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A. The Nagoya High Court's Standard 
The high court used a three-pronged analysis to determine 
whether the state action was religious. The court asked "[l] 
whether the ceremony was conducted by a man belonging to 
some religious sect, [2] whether the ceremony was performed 
following an order set by a religious sect, and [3] whether the 
ceremony was of such a nature as to be accepted by every ordi- 
nary person without any feeling of discord."31 
In addressing the first two considerations, the court noted 
that the ceremony was of ancient Shinto origin and until the 
conclusion of World War 11, had been administered by the 
Home Ministry, a government bureau which, before its abol- 
ishment, had dealt with the administration of Shinto shrines 
and rituald2 The court, focusing on history, thus emphasized 
the religious nature of the ceremony. In addressing the third 
consideration, the court found that the jichinsai was accepted 
by every ordinary person without discord.33 
The court then held that a simple showing that a state 
entity performed a religious activity or otherwise "assist[ed]" a 
religion is sufficient to establish a violation of Article Twenty's 
guarantee of the separation of church and state.34 Under this 
standard, the court held that the ceremony was not "of a purely 
customary nature" and was thus a violation of paragraph three 
of Article Twenty? 
HANJI 8 (Japan). A partial English translation of this decision is contained in 
TANAKA, supra note 11, at  735-37. 
31. TANAKA, supra note 11, at 736. 
32. Id. The Home Ministry (naimu shou) was disbanded by the Allied Forces 
in 1947. 
33. The court did not question the validity or usefulness of this "discord" 
inquiry in a society such as Japan's where the Shinto religion is highly integrated 
into mainstream culture. This issue is addressed in part V I A ,  infra. 
34. TANAKA, supra note 11, at  736. 
35. Id. It is of great interest to note that in reversing the decision of the 
district court, the Nagoya High Court also held that 
it is not necessary to prove that there was any compulsion to attend a 
religious activity. The fact that the state or a local public entity per- 
formed a religious activity is in itself a violation of [the] principle [of 
separation of church and state]. The fact that the political power, prestige 
and money of the state or a public entity are behind the public perfor- 
mance of a religious activity by a certain sect, in itself constitutes the 
giving of assistance to that sect, brings it nearer to the position of an 
established religion, and serves as an indirect pressure against other 
religious groups and nonbelievers . . . . 
Id. This holding was later rejected in its entirety by the majority in Nakaya. 
N m Y A  v. JAPAN 
There are problems with this standard. Such a deep chasm 
between religion and state could potentially deny any sort of 
government assistance to religious groups. This would result in 
a government position that is in fact hostile to religion rather 
than one that is accommodative. In contrast, government assis- 
tance or accommodation would continue to be freely available 
to other social or political groups simply because they do not 
bear the stigma of "religion." 
B. The Tsu City Decision 
On appeal, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed the high 
court's decision. The court declined to apply the Nagoya court's 
three-pronged standard, creating a new standard based on "the 
assessment of religion among ordinary people and the ideas 
current in [Japanese] society."36 Under this new standard, the 
main considerations for determining whether governmental 
actions violate Article Twenty were (1) whether the actions of 
the governmental entity were for the purpose of propagating 
religion (the propagation prong); and (2) whether the activity 
interfered with other religions (the interference prong).37 Us- 
ing this standard, the court held that the ritual could not be 
construed as being religious because it was not for the purpose 
of propagating Shintoism and did not interfere with other reli- 
gions. 
C. Analysis of the Tsu City Standard 
The supreme court's standard is superior to the Nagoya 
High Court's. Instead of focusing solely on the religiosity of the 
action, the propagation prong ensures that government actions 
serving merely to accommodate religion will not violate Article 
Twenty as long as the government does not intend to promote a 
particular religion through its actions. 
The supreme court's interference prong, however, is poten- 
tially over-restrictive. It is virtually impossible to publicly prac- 
tice a religion without some interference with the belief sys- 
tems of others. Some amount of toleration and accommodation 
of others' beliefs is necessary to maintain the freedom of all 
36. Yanagawa & Reid, supra note 28, at 513 (quoting Judgment of July 13, 
1977, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan)). 
37. Judgment of July 13, 1977, Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 
(Japan). 
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religions; the Tsu City standard could be interpreted to ban all 
governmental accommodation of public religious practice. 
Furthermore, by basing the analysis upon "the assessment 
of religion among ordinary people and the ideas current in 
so~iety,"~ the Tsu City standard exposes itself to the same 
problem faced by that of the High Court. That is, by requiring 
that decisions be based on societal norms, the standard poten- 
tially ignores minority voices.39 This standard stood unchal- 
lenged in the supreme court for more than a decade before the 
issue of religious rights was again addressed in Nakaya v. 
Japan. 
IV. N ~ Y A  v. JAPAN 
A. Facts 
Yasuko Nakaya lives in Yuda, a town on the outskirts of 
Yamaguchi City near the southern end of Japan's main island. 
In 1958, she was baptized into the Yamaguchi Shin'ai Church 
of the United Church of Christians, joining the mere 1.4% of 
Japanese citizens who consider themselves Christians." She 
married Takafbmi Nakaya in 1959 in a ceremony involving no 
religious rituals, and they resided in the city of Morioka where 
Takafumi was a member of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) of Ja- 
pan.*' Takafumi did not believe in any particular religiod2 
38. Id. (English translation from Yanagawa & Reid, supra note 28, a t  500, 
512). 
39. See infra part V I A ,  which discusses in greater depth the problem of 
confusing assimilated religion with culture. Because over 95% of the Japanese 
population practices Shinto, it might be difficult for this standard to protect the 
small minority whose religious ideals by definition exclude them from the category 
of "ordinary people," and whose small numbers weaken their voice in the crescendo 
of "ideas current in society." 
40. 95.8% of Japanese practice Shinto, 76.3% practice Buddhism, 1.4% prac- 
tice Christianity, and 12.0% practice another religion. These statistics reflect the 
Japanese practice of observing multiple religions. Kaleidoscope: Current World Data, 
February 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, KCWD File. 
Christianity has experienced dark periods in Japanese history. After some ini- 
tial acceptance, Japanese leaders turned against the foreign religion. Twenty-six 
Christians were crucified in Nagasaki in 1597, and thousands of murders and other 
serious persecutions continued into the early seventeenth century. Christianity was 
officially outlawed in 1614. See VARLEY, supra note 7, at 146-49. 
41. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 3. The Self-Defense Forc- 
es evolved from the National Police Reserves which were created by Gen. Douglas 
MacArthur in response to the onset of the Korean War. NORMA FIELD, IN TKE 
REALM OF A DYING EMPEROR: JAPAN AT CENTURY'S END 109 (1991). These forces 
might be compared to the national reserve system in the United States with a 
major exception being that the Japanese constitution forbids the Self-Defense Forc- 
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In 1968, he was killed in an on-duty car accident and given a 
Buddhist funeral at  the request of his father. Yasuko later held 
a Christian fbneral service at  her church. 
Earlier, in 1964, the prefectural Veterans Association, a 
private organization concerned with relations between the SDF 
and the general public, had spoken with a Shinto priest regard- 
ing the possibility of enshrining the spirits of local SDF officers 
who had died during service. This enshrinement would occur at  
a Shinto defense-of-the-nation (gokoku) shrine, whose pre- 
World War I1 function was to deify those who died in military 
actions." Such shrines are wholly religious in nature? This 
initial request for enshrinement was denied. 
In 1970, during further discussions with the priests of the 
shrine, the Veterans Association enlisted the assistance of the 
prefectural Regional Liaison Office (the Regional Office), the 
government body in charge of SDF affairs. The Regional Office 
assisted the Veterans Association by (1) obtaining information 
from other prefectures to determine their practices and opin- 
ions regarding such enshrinement, (2) sending requests to the 
deceased officers' families for the documents and information 
required for enshrinement, (3) soliciting donations from the 
families for enshrinement fees, and (4) managing all donations 
received. The Regional Office, a t  the Veterans Association's 
request, also drafted an application procedure for the enshrine- 
ment of SDF officers. During the negotiation process, an ad- 
ministrative officer of the Regional Office communicated direct- 
ly with the chief Shinto priest a t  the local gokoku shrine>5 
During these negotiations, Mrs. Nakaya received communi- 
cations from both the Veterans Association and the Regional 
Office requesting vital statistics and documents necessary for 
the enshrinement. Mrs. Nakaya repeatedly refused to provide 
the information for the enshrinement and voiced her objections 
during several telephone conversations with both organizations. 
In March of 1972, the gokoku shrine agreed to proceed with the 
enshrinement ceremony for the officers. Despite Mrs. Nakaya's 
es from participating in any military activity other than in defense of their coun- 
try. KENPOU [Constitution] art. M, 'jj'j[ 1-2 (Japan). 
42. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 3. 
43. For a brief history of gokoku shrines and their role in state Shinto as 
well as reflections on the Nakaya case, see Sakai Takeshi, A Matter of Faith, 15 
JAPAN Q. 357 (1988). 
44. See Id. 
45. Id. at 4-6. 
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protests, the enshrinement was conducted on April 19, 1972. 
Mrs. Nakaya later received a certificate from the shrine which 
stated: "Offerings for the Sacred Eternal Prayer in memory of 
Shinto Deity Nakaya Takafumi [are] solemnly accepted. 
Hereafter, Memorial Services will continue to be held on the 
12th day of January, eternally."46 Mrs. Nakaya brought suit 
against the government, alleging that the actions of the Region- 
al Office violated the constitutional guarantee of separation of 
church and state and deprived her of her personal religious 
rights.47 
B. Judicial History 
The Yamaguchi District Court ruled in favor of Mrs. 
Nakaya, holding that the government's cooperation with the 
private Veterans Association was a substantial factor in the 
shrine's ultimate decision to proceed with the enshrinement 
ceremony and thus violated the separation of church and state 
as guaranteed by the Constitution of Japan. The court also 
held that the enshrinement "infringed on [Mrs. Nakaya's] legal 
interest to live under a quiet religious atmosphere, or infringed 
on her personal religious right."48 Upon the government's ap- 
peal, the Regional High Court affirmed the district court's rul- 
ing. An appeal to the Japanese Supreme Court followed. 
C. Holding of the Nakaya Court 
In an unusually long and fragmented decision, the Japa- 
nese Supreme Court ruled fourteen to one to reverse the hold- 
ings of the lower courts. Reviewing the events leading up to the 
enshrinement, the court determined that the enshrinement 
"was basically realized through the efforts of the Veterans 
Asso~ia t ion ,~~  and that the Regional Office's activities had 
46. Id. at 5-6. In the certificate Mr. Nakaya's name is written with the fami- 
ly name first as is customary in Japan. 
The enshrinement ceremony consists of prayers for the deceased and a ritual 
which transmits the soul of the deceased into a small piece of wood bearing the 
name of the deceased preceded by the title god. Clyde Haberman, Shinto Is Thrust 
Back onto the Nationalist Stage, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1988, at  A4. 
47. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supm note 2, at  4-7. 
48. Id. at 7-8. 
49. Id. at 9. The court stated that "the application . . . was made under the 
name of the Veterans Association [andl was filed independently in its substance 
and could not be regarded as a joint action of the Regional Office staff and the 
Veterans Association, nor [could it] be considered that the office staff themselves 
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only an "indirect relation with the religion."" Thus, the court 
concluded that the government's actions were sufficiently inde- 
pendent from the Veterans Association's activities and were 
constitutionally permissible. The court also rejected Mrs. 
Nakaya's claim of a personal religious right. 
1. The court's standard 
The Nakaya court held that the term "religious activity 
should not be construed to include any activities relating to 
religion but . . . only the activity whose purpose has a religious 
meaning and whose effect is to promote, to facilitate, to acceler- 
ate, to oppress or to intervene [sic] a religi~n."~' The court 
made this determination based on a standard consisting of an 
"objective 0" decision that "follow [s] common sense" and gives 
express consideration to "various factors such as place of the 
action, the public's evaluation, intent, purpose and religious 
feelings of those who act, its effect and influence to the general 
public, e t ~ . " ~ ~  
The court also held that even if the actions of the Regional 
Office violated Paragraph three, "the institutional guarantee 
does not guarantee the [sic] religious freedom itself directly to 
individual persons, but rather it is an attempt to indirectly 
guarantee the freedom of religion by setting forth the parame- 
ters of actions which the State and its organs may not con- 
In summary, the court held that when considering the 
religious rights of individuals, religious activities of government 
will not be considered to violate the Constitution of Japan un- 
less the actions directly restrict or compel religious activities as 
provided in the second sentence of paragraph one and in para- 
graph two of Article Twenty. 
2. The personal religious right 
Addressing Mrs. Nakaya's claim that she was entitled to 
relief based on a "personal religious right," the Japanese Su- 
applied for it." Id. at 9-10. The court did, however, find that there had been some 
cooperation between the two entities, mostly in the form of clerical work. Id. at 9. 
50. Id. at 11. 
51. Id. at 10. 
52. Id. (citing as the source of this standard Judgment of July 13, 1977, 
Saikousai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan)). 
53. Id. at 11. 
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preme Court again reversed the lower courts' holdings, finding 
that the "religious personal right" or in other words, the "inter- 
est to live a religious life under a quiet religious atmo- 
sphere,'754 could not be recognized as a protected interest un- 
der the Constitution of Japan.55 
D. Analysis of the Nakaya Court's Decision 
1. Separation of church and state: revision of the Tsu City 
standard 
In Nakaya, the court considered two factors in making its 
constitutional inquiry into Article Twenty, paragraph three: 
first, what is the permissible extent of governmental involve- 
ment in supporting religious activities, and second, what was 
the purpose and nature of the government agency's action. The 
court did not articulate a precise standard for the first factor, 
but seemed to make its determination based on the particular 
facts of the case. This factual inquiry addressed the question of 
whether the application for enshrinement should have been 
regarded as a joint action of the Regional Office and the Veter- 
ans Association. 
a. The first factor: the scope of the actions of the Regional 
Ofice. As previously stated, the court concluded that the 
actions taken by the Regional Office could not be construed to 
be a unified action with the Veterans Association. Nine of the 
fifteen judges agreed on this point. The court reasoned that the 
request for enshrinement originated with the families of the 
dead SDF officers, the president of the private veterans group 
was the primary negotiator with the shrine's chief priest,56 
and the actions of the Regional Office Staff were only clerical in 
nature.57 Based on these considerations, the majority held 
that the enshrinement was "basically realized through the 
efforts of the Veterans A~sociation."~~ 
The language of the court suggests that stricter scrutiny 
may be applied to more directly collaborative efforts between 
the government and private organizations with respect to reli- 
gious activities. Thus, if the Regional Office had tried to direct- 
54. Id. at 12-13. 
55. Id. at 11-14. 
56. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 9. 
57. Id. at 9-10. 
58. Id. at 9. 
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ly persuade the shrine to go through with the enshrinement, 
the court may have been more inclined to find the Regional 
Office's involvement unconstit~tional.~~ In sum, the court sug- 
gested that indirect government involvement-specifically that 
which is only clerical in n a t u r e i s  not necessarily prohibited 
by the Constitution's Institutional Guarantee. 
b. The second factor: the constitutional effect of the action. 
After discussing the permissible extent of government involve- 
ment in religious activities, the court focused on the purpose 
and religious nature of the actions of the governmental agency. 
The court stated that paragraph three of Article Twenty 
"should not be construed to include any activities relating to 
religion but to mean only the activity whose purpose has a reli- 
gious meaning and whose effect is to promote, to facilitate, to 
accelerate, to oppress or to intervene [sic] a religi~n."~' The 
court set up a standard resembling the rule stated in Tsu City, 
developing a non-exclusive list of considerations to be used to 
determine the constitutionality of governmental actions involv- 
ing religion. These considerations are: (1) the "place of the 
action," (2) "the public's evaluation" of the action, (3) the "in- 
tent, purpose and religious feelings of those who act," and 
(4) the action's "effect and influence to the general pub- 
lic. . . .*' Using these guidelines, the court concluded that 
the actions of the Regional Office were constitutionally permis- 
sible. 
The first and third considerations appear to focus on the 
religiosity and purpose of the governmental action. The second 
and fourth considerations seem to focus on the degree of reli- 
gious divisiveness engendered by the action in the community 
as a whole. Thus, in applying the new standard, the court 
seems to have kept Tsu City's propagation analysis while aban- 
59. This would seem to be similar to the excessive government entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test, discussed infia, part V.A. 
In Nakaya, there was some debate as to the extent of the influence of the 
Regional Office's involvement. Some of the justices were concerned that the gokoku 
shrine did not grant permission for the enshrinement until the Regional Office had 
become involved in the proceedings. There was evidence to suggest that in addition 
to the clerical responsibilities, the Regional Ofice's involvement served to convince 
the shrine to go through with the enshrinement. The majority of the cqurt did not 
agree with this assertion, however, and determined that the actions of the Regional 
Office did not have a significant influence on the shrine's decision to conduct the 
enshrinement. 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. Id. 
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doning its interference analysis in favor of requiring a showing 
of social divisiveness. The reason for the change in standards is 
unclear. The Nakaya court did not explain its rationale for sub- 
stituting social divisiveness for the interference factor.62 
In applying its standard, the Nakaya court accommodates 
some government involvement with religion by permitting 
government involvement that does not promote, facilitate, ac- 
celerate, oppress, or intervene in a religion. The court specified 
that at  least two kinds of government action fall into this cate- 
gory: those that have only indirect relations with religion (for 
example, actions consisting of mainly clerical work), and those 
that serve to promote secular purposes, such as raising the 
morale and social status of  employee^.^^ Nevertheless, the 
court did not clearly delineate the actual extent of permissible 
government activity. 
2. The court's treatment of paragraph one, sentence two 
Paragraph one, sentence two of Article Twenty provides 
that "In] o religious organization shall receive any privileges 
from the State nor exercise any political a~ thor i ty . "~~  It could 
be argued that the shrine received a privilege &om the state in 
the form of clerical assistance in violation of the second sen- 
tence of paragraph one. The court's determination that govern- 
ment actions must not serve to promote or accelerate religion 
may be seen as the application of this constitutional principle. 
However, the court did not mention this constitutional provi- 
sion, and the exact implications of the second sentence of para- 
graph one remain unclear.65 
The court may have determined that the terms "promote" 
and "accelerate" are sufficiently broad to include the terms in 
this sentence. On the other hand, a more direct application of 
this sentence may add a new dynamic to the analysis by adding 
the words "privilege" and "political authority" to the list of 
unconstitutional effects of government involvement in religion. 
62. The Nakaya court appears to have adopted the same standard they reject- 
ed eleven years earlier in their review of the Nagoya High Courfs decision in Tsu 
City. The problems inherent in both of these analyses when applied to a society in 
which religion is deeply assimilated into the people's cultural consciousness are 
discussed infra, at part V1.A 
63. Id. at 10-11. 
64. KENPOU [Constitution] art. XX, 1 1 (Japan). 
65. See Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, at 9-11. 
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3. Mrs. Nakaya's free exercise claim 
In addition to her Article Twenty, paragraph three claims, 
Mrs. Nakaya asserted a cause of action based on a theo- 
ry-previously untested in Japanese religious freedom adju- 
dication-that might be characterized as analogous to a free- 
exercise argument in American jurispr~dence.~~ Mrs. Nakaya 
asserted that she was entitled to a "religious personal right" 
under paragraphs one and two of Article Twenty. The first 
sentence of paragraph one reads: "Freedom of religion is guar- 
anteed to all."67 Paragraph two reads: "No person shall be 
compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or 
practice."B8 Together, these sentences ensure that individuals 
in Japan are free to practice their religious beliefs. 
a. The personal right of religious fieedom. Mrs. Nakaya 
argued that she had a "religious personal right," which entailed 
a legal interest in religious privacy and the ability to "live un- 
der a quiet religious atmo~phere. '~~ Although arguments pred- 
icated on "personal rights" are rare in Japan, they have been 
used with some success in environmental litigation." Realiz- 
ing this, Mrs. Nakaya seized the opportunity to present a "per- 
sonal rights" argument in a religious ~ontext.~' This argument 
was upheld in the two lower courts, but the Japanese Supreme 
Court reversed.72 The court devoted minimal analysis to the 
claim, merely stating that Mrs. Nakaya's claims of a "religious 
personal right [and a] right of religious privacy" had "no rea- 
son"73 and that such a right could not be recognized under the 
Japanese Constitution because Mrs. Nakaya had not alleged 
"that any disadvantage was suffered because she did not attend 
the ceremonies" nor had she made a showing that she "was 
prohibited, restricted, suppressed or intervened in any way to 
66. Aside from analysis in conjunction with the Institutional Guarantee in 
Tsu City, the Japanese Supreme Court had never addressed a religious free exer- 
cise question until its brief discussion of "the personal religious right" in Nakaya. 
67. KENPOU [Constitution] art. XX, 'I[ 1. 
68. KENPOU art. XX, 'J[ 2. 
69. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supm note 2, at  8, 13. 
70. Karl Schoenberger, Japan Widow Loses Religious Rights Case, L.A. TIMES, 
June 2, 1988, pt. 1, at 7. 
71. Id. 
72. This was not a surprise to Kenkichi Nakahira, head attorney for Mrs. 
Nakaya, who stated: "We weren't surprised the Supreme Court didn't recognize it, 
given its conservative bent." Id. 
73. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supm note 2, at 13-14. 
708 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
believe in Christianity or to mourn her late husband based on 
her religious faith."74 
b. The court's analysis of the personal religious right. In 
rejecting the religious personal right, the majority opinion 
reasoned that "[tlhe guarantee of freedom of religion requires 
tolerance for religious activities of others that are inconsistent 
with the religion that one believes in as long as such activity 
does not disturb his or her freedom of religion through compul- 
sion or by giving rise to  disadvantage^."'^ In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Nagashima added that "it is constitutionally 
required that a religion should tolerate activities of other reli- 
gions and should not interfere with nor disturb them? 
Only two justices, Sakaue and Ito (the lone dissenter), 
failed to side with the majority on this issue. Justice Sakaue's 
analysis of this issue is of particular interest. Although Justice 
Sakaue would recognize a personal religious right "on the 
grounds of infringement of religious feelings" in relation to an 
enshrinement that is against the will of the plaintiff,77 he 
would limit its application by (1) not recognizing the plaintiffs 
legal right if the enshrinement was "based on the will of the 
deceased himselcf18 and (2) not recognizing a legal right when 
other members of the family support the enshrinement and 
there are no "special circumstances as to give priority to [the 
plaintiffs] mental pea~e."~ Applying these standards, Justice 
Sakaue concluded that Mrs. Nakaya was not entitled to legal 
compensation or an injunction because some members of her 
family-notably her father-in-law-had been supportive of the 
enshrinement and because there was no reason "to give priority 
to . . . the spouse of the deceased rather than to . . . the fa- 
ther."80 Although Justice Sakaue's standard would not have 
provided relief in Mrs. Nakaya's case, it does recognize a free 
exercise right. His proposed standard, however, may be prob- 
lematic in that it requires extensive factual inquiry into the 
74. Id. at 13. While the reasons for rejecting the "personal religious right" 
claim appear to address standing issues, it is clear that the Nakaya court rejected 
not only Mrs. Nakaya's assertion of the right, but also the validity of the right 
itself. Id. at 13-14. 
75. Id. at 12. 
76. Id. at 15 (Nagashima, J., concurring). 
77. Id. at 29 (Sakaue, J., concurring). 
78. Id. at 31 (Sakaue, J., concurring). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 31-32. 
69 11 NAKAYA v. JAPAN 709 
minds and intentions of family members. In addition, the stan- 
dard could serve to exacerbate emotional divisions in fami- 
lies-a result almost universally held to be against public poli- 
cy- 
Nakaya appears to be the only Japanese Supreme Court 
case which addresses a free exercise claim. Based on the court's 
analysis, it appears that while such a claim may eventually be 
recognized, it faces a difficult path in obtaining full legal accep- 
tance. The court is clearly more willing to analyze questions 
such as Mrs. Nakaya's solely in the establishment context. 
V. COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES' RELIGION CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Despite its unique history and culture, the constitutional 
religious freedom issues facing Japan are similar to those faced 
elsewhere. For instance, many of the establishment issues 
raised in the Nakaya case have been debated in state and fed- 
eral courts in the United States. Because the Constitution of 
Japan was drafted primarily by Americans and is interpreted 
through a judicial review process similar to that in the United 
States, some insight into Nakaya's reasoning can be gained by 
comparing the standards used in each country. 
A. The Lemon Test 
Some aspects of the Nakaya standard bear a striking re- 
semblance to the standard adopted by the United States Su- 
preme Court for determining the constitutionality of state ac- 
tions in the religious sphere-the Lemon test, established in 
Lemon v. Kurt~rnan?~ In order to be constitutional under the 
Lemon test, a governmental action must satisfy three separate 
inquiries: (1) the action must have a secular purpose, (2) the 
principal or primary effect of the action must be one that nei- 
ther advances nor inhibits a particular religion, and (3) the 
action must not constitute an excessive government entangle- 
ment with religion. This analysis has been applied to a wide 
variety of Establishment Clause cases. In comparing the Lemon 
test to the analysis used in Nakaya, this comment will focus on 
the line of United States cases most analogous to the issue in 
Nakaya-those dealing with the display of creches or other 
religious articles on public land. 
81. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
710 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
Among the most significant cases addressing religious 
displays are Lynch v. ~ o n n e l l ~ ~ ~  and County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union.83 In Lynch, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a city's Christmas display of a creche, 
along with other holiday symbols, did not violate the Establish- 
ment Clause. In County of Allegheny, however, the Court held 
that a city's display of a lone creche at the top of the court- 
house steps was violative of the Establishment Clause. The 
Court applied the Lemon test in both situations. 
In Lynch, the Court, applying Lemon's first prong, rea- 
soned that there was a secular purpose for the display because 
it was sponsored by the city in order to "depict the origins of 
that Holiday? In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor com- 
pared the creche to legislative prayers and "the printing of 'In 
God We Trust' on our coins," stating that such religious activi- 
ties serve the secular purpose of "solemnizing public occasions, 
expressing confidence in the future and encouraging the recog- 
nition of what is worthy of appreciation in ~ociety."~ 
Based on the Lemon holdings, it appears that the 
government's actions in Nakaya would also pass the Lemon 
test's first prong. The stated purpose of the actions of the Re- 
gional Office was to increase the morale and social status of the 
SDF members. The morale and social status of military person- 
nel are legitimate secular concerns of virtually all governments. 
Additionally, it is apparent that the enshrinement would be 
congruent with Justice O'Connor's statement. Just as legisla- 
tive prayers or the display of a creche solemnize public occa- 
sions and encourage "recognition of what is worthy of apprecia- 
tion in society," the enshrinement solemnizes the efforts of 
those SDF officers who had died on duty and provides public 
recognition of their sacrifice. 
With respect to the second prong-that the principal or 
primary effect of the government action neither advance nor 
inhibit religion-the Lynch Court concluded that the display of 
the creche did not have the principal or primary effect of ad- 
vancing or inhibiting religion because any advancement of 
religion due to the display of the creche was "indirect, remote 
82. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
83. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
84. Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 at 681. 
85. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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and incidental."" The Court reasoned that the display of the 
creche did not advance religion any more than the display of 
religious paintings in public  museum^.^' 
In County of Allegheny, however, the Court held that the 
display of the creche did advance religion. The Court gave great 
weight to the fact that the creche was displayed on its own, 
whereas the creche in Lynch was placed among other holiday 
symbols such as Santa Claus and reindeer. In addition, the 
Allegheny display had a large banner proclaiming "Gloria in 
Excelsis Deo," and was positioned at the top of the courthouse 
steps, a prominent public location.88 Based on these differenc- 
es, the Allegheny Court distinguished Lynch and held that the 
second prong of the Lemon test was not met, thus finding the 
display of the creche to be unconstitutional. County of Alleghe- 
ny suggests that in the United States the public prominence of 
the governmental actions and the message they convey are 
important in determining whether the actions advance or in- 
hibit religion. 
The Nakaya court similarly looked at the underlying mean- 
ing and effect of the governmental action in making its deter- 
mination. In Nakaya, the majority found that the Japanese 
Constitution was not violated as long as the governmental 
actions did not "promote, facilitate, accelerate, oppress, or in- 
tervene" in a religion. Despite the similar language of the two 
standards, it appears that the Nakaya court's application of its 
standard might allow the government greater liberties in its 
actions. In Nakaya the government helped to facilitate a public 
ceremony involving only one religion. The Regional Office made 
no effort to contact other religious or civic groups even though 
they too could perform ceremonies or give special notice to raise 
the morale of SDF officers. 
Singling out one religion appears to be contrary to the 
United States Constitution as evidenced by Bd. of Trustees v. 
~ c ~ r e a r y , "  another case involving the display of a creche. In 
McCreary, the city council of a predominantly Jewish communi- 
ty refused to allow a coalition of Christian groups to continue 
the placement of a creche in a public park. In holding this 
refusal to be unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the impor- 
86. Id at 683. 
87. Id. 
88. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 at 598-602. 
89. 471 U.S. 83 (1985), affg 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984). 
712 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
tance of assuring that the park provide equal access to all reli- 
gious and civic groups,g0 implying that giving exclusive atten- 
tion to one religion strongly suggests that the government 
action advances that particular religi~n.~' Thus, the Nakaya 
analysis seems to be more permissive than the Lemon test in 
that it permits governmental actions that accommodate one 
particular religion exclusively, while the Lemon test, as applied 
to the creche cases, does not. 
The third prong of the Lemon test states that the govern- 
ment action must not result in undue governmental entangle- 
ment with religion.92 In Lynch the Court found, based on sev- 
eral factors, that there was no undue government entangle- 
ment. First, while the city erected and maintained the display, 
it did not contact any religious organization regarding the de- 
sign or placement of the display. Second, the city had paid only 
a nominal price for the display and had spent no other money 
on its maintenan~e.'~ Third, the Court concluded that there 
was no evidence of "comprehensive, discriminating, and con- 
tinuing state surveillance" or "enduring entanglement" referred 
to in Lemon v. K u r t ~ m a n . ~ ~  The Nakaya test similarly re- 
quires governmental actions to be only indirectly related to 
religion, yet clearly allows for some expenditure of governmen- 
tal time and funding, such as were expended on the clerical 
activities involved in the Nakaya case. 
Another factor U.S. courts consider in applying the exces- 
sive entanglement test is the political divisiveness of the situa- 
tion. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court "has not held that politi- 
cal divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permis- 
sible conduct."95 Thus, political divisiveness is not in itself a 
90. 739 F.2d at  724-26. 
91. See also Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 938-39 
(Utah 1993) (expressing the need to assure that public funds and facilities are 
accessible to all in order to avoid the promotion of a particular religion). 
92. This is similar to the first issue addressed by the Nakaya court where it 
held that indirect, clerical government actions were permissible. 
93. 465 U.S. 668 at 684. 
94. 403 U.S. at 619-22. 
95. Lynch, 465 U.S. at  684. The concurrence stated: 
Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Establishment 
Clause. Its existence may be evidence that institutional entanglement is 
excessive or that a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of 
religion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the 
character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, 
not on the divisiveness itself. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test 
is properly limited to institutional entanglement. 
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prong in the Lemon test. In contrast, the Nakaya analysis re- 
quires a consideration of the action's "effect and influence to 
the general public . . . .7'96 Thus, it appears that social divi- 
siveness is a major consideration in determining the nature 
and purpose of the government action in Japan. The extent to 
which political divisiveness is encompassed within the concept 
of social divisiveness, however, is unclear. 
The analysis in Nakaya has much in common with the 
Lemon test. They both seem to require that there be a secular 
purpose behind the governmental actions. Each requires that 
the government action not advance nor inhibit religion, al- 
though the Nakaya analysis seems to be more permissive in 
that it accommodates governmental actions directed at  a partic- 
ular religion. Finally, both tests allow only minimal entangle- 
ment of government in religion. In making this determination 
both consider the extent of divisiveness caused by the 
government's action, but the Nakaya analysis seems to place 
more weight on this factor than the United States Supreme 
Court's analysis does. 
B. Comparative Analysis Under the Endorsement Standard 
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicate 
that the Lemon test may be abandonedg7 in favor of the en- 
dorsement analy~is.'~ This analysis makes a single determi- 
nation: whether the government's conduct amounts to an en- 
dorsement of a particular religion or religious beliefs, or of re- 
ligion generally. Because the test has yet to be adopted by a 
Id. a t  689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concluded that "political 
divisiveness along religious lines should not be an independent test of constitution- 
ality." Id. The Court may have shied away from a political divisiveness inquiry due 
to concern that litigants may "create the appearance of divisiveness" simply by 
commencing a lawsuit. The litigant could then exploit the resulting divisiveness as 
evidence of government entanglement. Id. at  684-85. I t  may also be due to con- 
cerns over religious acculturation, a problem which is discussed infra part V1.A. 
96. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, a t  10 (citing Judgment of 
July 13, 1977, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshuu 533 (Japan)). 
97. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660-61 (1992); Texas Monthly, Inc. 
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
98. This test's main proponent and author is Justice O'Connor. For an in- 
depth discussion of the pros and cons of the proposed standard, see Lynch, 465 
US. a t  668, particularly the separate opinions of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy; 
W. Scott Simpson, Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed 
Modifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 465; William P. Marshall, We Know It When We See It": The Supreme 
Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986). 
714 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
majority of the Court, it is difficult to state conclusively what 
the exact wording of a final endorsement test might be. Howev- 
er, Justice O'Connor has articulated it as follows: 
The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is wheth- 
er a reasonable observer would view such longstanding 
[governmental] practices as a disapproval of his or her partic- 
ular religious choices, in light of the fact that [the governmen- 
tal practices] serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian 
one and have largely lost their religious significance over 
time?' 
If the facts of the Nakaya case were to be analyzed under this 
standard, the main question would appear to be whether the 
actions of the Regional Office served to promote Shinto and/or 
disapprove of Christianity.''' It would appear that the Re- 
gional Office's exclusive focus on Shinto would weigh heavily 
against the constitutionality of its actions. There is no indica- 
tion, however, that the Nakaya court would have necessarily 
reached the opposite conclusion under this standard. In fact, 
the holding that the Regional Office's exclusive focus on Shinto 
did not constitute propagation of that religion might indicate 
that the outcome of Nakaya would remain unchanged under 
the endorsement analysis. 
C. Comparative Analysis Under the Utah Constitution 
It is also interesting to compare Nakaya to a Utah case 
addressing very similar issues. In Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead,'" the Utah Supreme Court held that some gov- 
ernmental clerical assistance may be provided to facilitate 
activities that are religious in nature without violating Utah's 
constitutional guarantee of separation of church and state.'02 
99. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (O'Connor, J., concur- 
ring). Justice O'Comor has also stated that the standard "preclude[s] government 
from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular 
religious belief is favored or preferred." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
100. This formulation of the inquiry is reinforced by Justice O'Connor's state- 
ment that "the term 'endorsement' is closely linked to the term 'promotion' . . . ." 
492 US. a t  593. 
101. 870 P.2d 916. 
102. Article one, section four of the Utah Constitution states: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the fkee exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office 
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In Whitehead, the Salt Lake City Council was sued by a 
separationist group seeking to enjoin the City Council's practice 
of inviting members of various religious groups to offer prayers 
or personal thoughts before the commencement of its public 
meetings. This practice was governed by several procedures. 
First, the city council's staff was required to mail letters to a 
wide variety of churches and other civic organizations every six 
months in order to inform them of the city council's practice 
and invite them to participate. The staff was also responsible 
for the scheduling of requests to participate in the brief ceremo- 
ny. Secondly, the staff was required to keep a list of those who 
participated and to provide that list to the city attorney and 
other officials biannually.lo3 The Utah Supreme Court held 
that the clerical activities necessitated by this practice were not 
violative of the state constitutional guarantee. Thus, as with 
Nakaya, government entities were permitted to use government 
time, personnel, and funds to support religious activities. 
Both the Nakaya court and the Utah Supreme Court relied 
on the facts of the individual case in determining the extent of 
government involvement. The determination of the extent of 
government involvement is factual: the legal question is where 
the line should be drawn between permissible and impermis- 
sible government involvement. Although neither court set forth 
an identifiable bright line, a comparison of each court's analysis 
of the facts of its case sheds some light on where such a line 
should be drawn. 
The actions of the Japanese Regional Office were some- 
what similar to those of the Salt Lake City Council staff. Both 
government offices drafted procedures for the handling of a 
religious activity, both were designated as the repositories for 
the documentation necessary to conduct the activity, and both 
solicited information from religious sources. There are some 
significant differences, however. The Salt Lake City Council 
of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be 
incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall 
any church dominate the State or inteTfere with its finctions. No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person to 
vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
UTAH CONST. art. I, 5 4 (emphasis added). 
103. Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 918 n.2. 
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staff was careful to solicit the participation of a broad range of 
diverse religious organizations. The Japanese Veterans Associa- 
tion, on the other hand, obtained clerical help from the Region- 
al Office in order to promote a religious activity unique to a 
particular religion. The Veterans Association's stated purpose 
for the enshrinement was to raise the morale and social status 
of SDF members.lo4 
There was evidence, however, that both the Regional Office 
and the Veterans Association were only interested in raising 
morale through a Shinto ritual. After the enshrinement, a 
member of the Regional Office staff told Mrs. Nakaya that "it 
was natural to deify Takafumi in the shrine because he had 
died for the State."lo5 On another occasion a staff member 
stated that "Gokoku Shrine is an official religion so that the 
Japanese national, regardless of religions of their families, 
should be officially deified to Gokoku Shrine."lOG These state- 
ments indicate that at least some members of the Regional 
Office Staff were focused exclusively on a Shinto enshrinement 
to raise the status and morale of SDF members. Although 
these statements were reviewed by the court, they did not 
convince it to hold that the actions were unconstitutional. 
Thus, the Nakaya court permitted government involvement 
that favored a particular religion. 
It appears that government actions such as those taken by 
the Salt Lake City Council in Whitehead would also be permis- 
sible under the Nakaya standard. It is highly questionable 
however, whether the reverse would be true. In Whitehead, the 
Utah Supreme Court gave substantial weight to the fact that 
the city council solicited input from varied groups and not only 
from those of the majority religion.'" Thus, the determina- 
104. The Nakaya court found that "the Regional Office had hoped for the en- 
shrinement of the dead SDF members in order to improve the social status of SDF 
members and to raise their morale." Jzufgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, 
a t  21. 
105. Id. at 24. On another occasion a staff member informed Mrs. Nakaya that 
the reason the SDF officers were enshrined was to insure "that dead SDF mem- 
bers who were killed while on duty would be ranked as highly as loyal retainer [of 
past wars] and that they had been deified so as to make SDF members in active 
service proud of their life and death." Id.; see also FIELD, supra note 41, a t  250 
(discussing speeches made by Regional Office members immediately following the 
enshrinement). 
106. Judgment on the Enshrinement, supra note 2, a t  24. 
107. See Whitehead, 870 P.2d a t  918-19, 938-39. In drafting the procedures, the 
City Council relied on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Stein v. 
Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1410 (5th Cir. 1987), taking steps to  
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tion of the type and nature of permissible government actions 
established in Nakaya seems to be less strict than the analysis 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in whitehead.lo8 
A. The Problem of Religious Acculturation 
The degree to which religion becomes integrated into a 
people's social and cultural consciousness can significantly 
affect the constitutional review of government actions in the 
religious realm. This problem of religious acculturation is par- 
ticularly important in Japan. 
Both the Nakaya and Lemon tests require a threshold 
finding that the activity a t  issue is "religious" in nature. Diffi- 
culties in making this determination arise where inherently 
religious activities are culturally ingrained in a particular com- 
munity or event, thus creating an overlap of culture and reli- 
gion. As a result, it is often difficult for courts to determine 
where culture ends and religion begins. Because the Nakaya 
court's "divisiveness" analysis places substantial weight on the 
public perception of a given government action, the accultura- 
tion of religion necessarily plays a large role in Japanese reli- 
gious-freedom jurisprudence. 
ensure that the prayers or comments were nondenominational and did not attempt 
to proselytize or prefer one religion over another. 
In addressing the propriety of the government preferring one religion over 
another, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In Utah, these lessons were learned a t  a steep price. We think that the 
drafters of the Utah Constitution achieved a remarkable degree of detach- 
ment from the passions that had swirled around them in the years pre- 
ceding 1895, and wisely concluded that it was best to maintain neutrality 
among various religious groups as well as between those whose conscienc- 
es were persuaded by religion and those whose consciences were not. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d at  940 (citation omitted). 
108. Three of the justices in Nakaya, however, found the adopted standard 
slightly troublesome. Although concurring in the judgment, they stated that while 
"the [statements of the Regional Office members] in themselves have nothing to do 
with the infringement alleged by the Appellee . . ." they "may cause suspicion 
against their religious neutrality and should be considered overdone." Judgment on 
the Enshrinement, supra note 2, a t  24 (Takashima, Yotsuya, and Okuno, JJ., con- 
curring). A fourth justice, reflecting on some of the post-enshrinement speeches 
given by Regional Office members, called them "inappropriate" and stated that the 
officials "should have exercised more self-restrain[tLn Id. at  21-22 (Nagashima, J., 
concurring). 
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1. Culture vs. religion: What constitutes religious activity in 
Japan? 
Because Japan's culture is so deeply rooted in Shinto, it is 
ofken difficult to separate Japanese culture from Japanese 
religion. Some rituals and rites of passage have become so 
commonly accepted that they are considered cultural events or 
customs and have nearly lost their religious  connotation^.'^^ 
Other rituals, such as formal Shinto purification rites, lie near 
the other end of the spectrum-they continue to be undeniably 
religious in nature even though they are commonly practiced by 
a majority of the Japanese population. In many situations, 
however, the distinction between cultural and religious activi- 
ties is less clear because of the high level of acculturation of 
Shinto in modern Japanese society. 
Scholars of Japanese religion have debated the question of 
what constitutes a religious activity for some time. One such 
debate occurred between Ian Reader and Richard Anderson 
involving the question of whether the ritual of offering an emu 
at  a Shinto shrine constituted a religious activity. An emu is a 
tablet sold at  a Shinto shrine that is often engraved with a 
request, in the form of a prayer, for a particular favor from the 
gods. The ema is purchased and offered to the Shrine.''' In 
one example of a typical emu ritual, a student visits a local 
shrine (one does not need to travel very far to find one in Ja- 
pan; shrines dot not only the cities, but the countryside as well) 
and purchases an ema with an engraving that requests help 
109. One example of this phenomenon is the Japanese custom of placing pine 
branches and a mandarin orange above a door (a kadomatsu) to welcome the New 
Year. This practice has roots in Shintoism, but has lost virtually all of its religious 
meaning. 
Another example, which is Buddhist in origin, is the Dharma doll (daruma 
ningyou). A Dharma doll is a round figure with a large face and two large, round 
eyes. A person purchases a Dharma doll and blacks in one eye, making a personal 
goal. When the goal is accomplished, the person colors in the other eye to mark its 
completion. This ritual has deep roots in Buddhism. Dharma was a Buddhist monk 
who was said to have lost both arms and legs due to lack of use as he sat in the 
lotus position seeking an understanding of enlightenment (hence the round shape 
of the doll). The basic messagethe importance of endurance-has virtually 
eclipsed any purely religious meaning associated with the ritual. 
As stated previously, courts in the United States have had many occasions to 
deal with similar situations, the most comparable seem to be the cases involving 
the public display of creches. 
110. For a more complete description of the emu ritual, see Ian Reader, Letters 
to the Gods: The Form and Meaning of Ema, 18 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS TUJI. 23 
(1991). 
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with an important examination. The student then offers the 
emu at the shrine. This involves a quick prayer1" before the 
shrine and a presentation of the emu.'" From a Western per- 
spective, the emu ritual would appear to be unquestionably 
religious, rather than purely c~ltural.''~ For the Japanese, 
however, the ritual's mixed historical, cultural, and religious 
associations make the distinction more problematic. 
Ian Reader argues that the historical merger of religion 
and culture does not render the ritual nonreligious; in spite of 
this merger the ritual can only be described as "religious be- 
havior."'14 Reader bases this determination on the fact that 
the ritual is "performed in a religious center" and that it uses 
"forms of behavior . . . that are generally accepted elements in 
the religious action of worship and prayer."'15 Additionally, 
the emu is purchased and deposited at the Shrine and the in- 
scription on the emu is addressed to the gods. 
Richard Anderson,'16 on the other hand, argues that the 
Japanese do not see the ema ritual as religious. He asserts that 
informal conversations with patrons of Shinto shrines show 
that the "vast majority" do not categorize the inscription of ema 
as "religion" (shuukyou) or as a "belief" (shinkou).'" Instead, 
he reports that the majority would describe the ritual as "cus- 
tom" or "habit" (~huukan)."~ These obsemations suggest that 
111. A Shinto prayer typically consists of ringing a bell to wake the gods, 
pressing the hands together in a position of respect and bowing slightly forward. 
At the conclusion of the prayer, the worshiper claps twice. 
112. The ema is donated to the shrine and many shrines have a special gal- 
lery dedicated to the emu offerings. 
113. Not surprisingly, many Japanese Christians appear to share this percep- 
tion. In questioning several native Japanese Christians, all felt that the ritual did 
not fit within the acceptable realm of Christian religious conduct. On the other 
hand, all agreed that there was no Christian religious objection to the use of 
kadomatsu or Dharma dolls. See supra note 109. While this informal poll cannot 
be considered statistically accurate, it indicates that to at  least some Christians in 
Japan, there is a definite distinction between religious and cultural rituals. 
114. Ian Reader, What Constitutes Religious Activity? (II), 18 JAPANESE J. RELI- 
GIOUS STUD. 373, 375 (1991). 
115. Id. 
116. Mr. Anderson describes himself as "a folklorist [who is] interested in 
modern Japanese society." Richard W. Anderson, What Constitutes Religious Activi- 
ty? (I), 18 JAPANESE J. OF RELIGIOUS TUD. 367, 367 (1991). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. Mr. Anderson's theory is subject to the same limitations as my infor- 
mal poll. See supra note 113. I t  is possible to reconcile the results because both 
polls are inherently biased. My poll focused on a small minority group-Japanese 
Christians-who felt the erna ritual was religious. Mr. Anderson's poll questioned 
people visiting the shrine, a group likely to represent the majority of Japanese who 
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the emu ritual has become so common that it has lost its reli- 
gious meaning to the majority of the Japanese populace. 
Ironically, both scholars are probably correct in their basic 
assumptions. While the religious overtones of the ritual are 
very apparent, a large part of the Japanese population seems 
to ignore the religious nature of the activity because they are 
highly accustomed to the practice. Using Mr. Anderson's labels, 
it is possible that most Japanese see those who make and sell 
emu as "artists" rather than "priests" and the ritual itself as 
"custom" rather than "religious activity."'" 
2. The problem of confusing culture with acculturated religion 
a. Manifestations of the problem in Japan. Mr. Anderson 
further asserts that an emu cannot be a religious item because 
he knows a restaurateur who hangs them on the wall and 
occasionally gives them as gifts to his patrons.'20 Mr. Reader 
counters that were crucifixes used in the same way, it would 
not negate their inherently religious nature.12' Some might 
suggest that Mr. Reader's argument-that acculturation does 
not deprive religious acts of their religiosity4nly demon- 
strates the difference between the Western and Japanese views 
of religion. However, this argument ignores the problem faced 
in Nakaya. The danger in the implications of Mr. Anderson's 
viewpoint lies in ignoring the Japanese inclination to label an 
intrinsically religious activity as "culture" because it is a com- 
mon practice, thus opening the door to government endorse- 
ment of the majority's religious activities (to the detriment of 
minority religions) on the assumption that such activities are 
merely a manifestation of national culture. 
The problem presented by acculturation of religious activi- 
ties into a dominant culture has also been discussed by Angela 
Carmella. Ms. Carmella suggests that such assimilation is a 
phenomenon common to the majority of religious tradi- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  She also suggests that theological analysis should be 
practice some form of Shinto and thus perform the emu ritual. This majority sees 
the ritual as a part of their customary routine. 
119. Id. at 369, 371. 
120. Id. at 371. 
121. Reader, supra note 114, at 375. 
122. Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 
60 GEO. W M .  L. REV. 782, 785 (1992). 
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relevant to legal decision-making.123 In the United States, the 
courts strongly discourage any inquiries into the doctrinal va- 
lidity of religious activities or into their relative degree of ne- 
cessity in a theological ~ 0 n t e x t . l ~ ~  This is a well-accepted and 
necessary safeguard to ensure the autonomy of religious beliefs 
and to protect the dignity of religions. Some courts have tried 
to protect the integrity and dignity of religions by evaluating 
the religious activity in question from the position of a "neutral 
observer." Ms. Carmella suggests that "the neutral observer 
misses entirely the reality of acculturation and calls 'secular' 
those religious activities that do not look sectarian, radical, or 
counter-~ultural."'~~ For example, one might assume that the 
performance of Shinto burial rites has only cultural significance 
and ignore the theological implications of those rites for a non- 
believer, dismissing her valid constitutional objections as irrele- 
vant. 
b. The Utah Supreme Court's treatment of the prob- 
lem. One effective approach to the problem of acculturation of 
religious activities is illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court 
case discussed above, Society of Separationists u. White- 
head.126 The State of Utah faces cultural circumstances some- 
what analogous to those of Japan. As a result of its unique 
history,127 Utah has a high concentration of Mormon inhabit- 
a n t ~ ' ~ ~  and consequently has a correspondingly high level of 
religious acculturation that can sometimes blur the line be- 
tween the religious and the c~ l tu ra1 . l~~  In addressing the reli- 
123. Id. a t  793-95. 
124. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (refusing to 
evaluate and make factual findings concerning the fundamental tenets of church 
doctrines); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 11416 (1952) (stating that U.S. constitutional jurisprudence 
prohibits state interference in matters of church doctrine); United States v. Ballard, 
322 U.S. 78, 85-88 (1944) (holding that religion itself cannot be the subject of tri- 
al). 
125. Carmella, supra note 122, a t  793. 
126. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
127. Utah was settled primarily by Mormon pioneers who were seeking a new 
home after being driven out of several states in the eastern and central United 
States. For a brief history of its settlement and government, see id. at  921-29. 
128. The official name of the Mormon Church is The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints. 
129. The differences between Japan and Utah, however, should also be empha- 
sized. Japan is culturally and ethnically isolated while Utah is part of a culturally 
and ethnically diverse nation. Utah also has a much higher percentage of minority 
religions and cultures than does Japan. Accordingly, Utah is subject to stronger 
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giosity of nondenominational prayer at City Council meetings, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a prayer addressed to God 
did constitute a religious activity. However, it distinguished 
prayers and references to God on American currency and in 
other public places from Christmas carols, reasoning that the 
latter, when "sung apart from a formalized worship service, on 
or off church property . . . are simply artistic expressions of a 
predominantly Christian culture. The same is true of any num- 
ber of other artistic expressions that have occupied center stage 
in Western European civilization for more than 1500 
years."130 This distinction takes into consideration the reli- 
gious history of the community when determining whether an 
activity is merely cultural or essentially religious. The ap- 
proach serves to protect the religious and cultural interests of 
the majority. It also ensures that truly religious activities of 
the majority, in this case those who believe in God, are proper- 
ly labeled as religious and thus not endorsed by the govern- 
ment, even though the conduct is highly acculturated in the 
community . 
In summary, when religion is highly acculturated, the 
method of analysis applied by courts must ensure that those 
aspects of the traditional culture that have some religious asso- 
ciation are not confused with true religious activity. The courts 
must protect non-assimilated religious minorities from subtle 
domination and oppression by a religious majority whose be- 
liefs are highly acculturated. Failure to account for religious 
acculturation can present a court with two potential problems. 
First, it may cause the court to refuse to recognize that an 
inherently religious activity is indeed religious simply because 
it consists of conduct that is arguably "cultural." Second, it may 
lead a court to deny appropriate constitutional protection to a 
majority religion simply because its activities are highly 
acculturated and the court fails to appropriately characterize 
the behavior as "religious." The Japanese Supreme Court 
should consider, as the Utah Supreme Court did, the underly- 
ing motivations, purpose, and nature of such actions when 
determining whether or not they are truly "religious." 
internal and external influences from minority concerns. This implies that if the 
acculturation of religion were ignored in both places, Japan's minorities will have 
comparatively less support and protection from non-judicial sources. 
130. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 932. 
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B. Japanese Culture's Effect on Free Exercise Jurisprudence. 
1. The problem of personal rights: Making waves in Japanese 
society 
Religious acculturation is not the only social factor signifi- 
cantly affecting religious freedoms in Japan. The court's rejec- 
tion of Mrs. Nakaya's claim of a personal religious right sug- 
gests another issue that should be considered by the Japanese 
Supreme Court: the apparent reluctancy of Japanese citizens to 
avoid enforcing individual rights through judicial action. The 
ideals of cooperation and harmony pervade almost every aspect 
of modern Japanese society, and the ever-present corollary to 
these ideas is the inclination to sacrifice individual interests for 
the benefit of the larger group.131 Perhaps in no other highly- 
developed country does the idea of the group play such a strong 
r01e.l~~ This is not to say that Japanese individuals are un- 
willing to think for themselves-this would clearly be incorrect. 
It is simply to recognize that Japan evidences an exceptionally 
strong cultural pressure to conform. 
131. At the turn of the century, one Japanese scholar commented: 
[Ilndividuals are not believed to exist for and of themselves as autono- 
mous entities; only the state does. In Japan, state sovereignty is heaven- 
granted while individual rights are bestowed by the state. The state al- 
lows limited individual rights to the extent that they further the aims of 
the state. Thus, individual rights are always instruments of the state, not 
to be utilised for the aims of the individual. While in the West individual 
rights are thought to be granted by heaven and thus inalienable . . . 
respect for individual rights and individual identity in the West is incon- 
ceivable for the Japanese, just as Japanese respect of state sovereignty 
and the state is inconceivable for Westerners. 
VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at  209-10 (quoting HAJIME KAWAKAMI, KAWAKAMI 
HAJIME CHOSAKUSHU [COLLECTED WORKS OF HAJIME KAWAKAMI] 190 (1964)). 
132. The Japanese ideal of communal unity of thought and action is best ex- 
pressed by the word wa. Wa is not easily translated into any single English word, 
but the word harmony may be the best one-word translation. The words of one 
Japanese official give more insight into its meaning: 
Japan's history is much different from that of the United States. . . . 
Today, as in the old days, the basic unit of Japanese society is not "at- 
omistic" individuals, but "molecule-like" groups. . . . The fundamental 
ethic which supports a group has been "harmony." Such American values 
as individual freedom, equality, equal opportunity, and an open-door pol- 
icy can be considered "foreign proteins" introduced into the traditional 
body of Japanese society. 
FFLWK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE I N  POSTWAR JAPAN 205-06 (1987) 
(quoting retired MITI official Amaya Naohiro); see also H A R M  BEN, JAPAN: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL NTRODUCTION 166-170 (1971). 
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This pressure contributes to the scarcity of lawyers in 
Japan. Japanese lawyers have not obtained the relatively high 
social status that their counterparts in the United States have. 
This is partly because the Japanese tend to avoid any kind of 
public dispute. In fact, there is much "cultural dislike" of law- 
yers and the court system in general.13 In the interest of 
"maintaining harmony,"134 the Japanese bring between one- 
twentieth and one-tenth as many cases as their Western neigh- 
b o r ~ . ' ~ ~  Some scholars have even suggested that government 
limitations on the number of lawyers, public veneration of the 
virtues of homogeneity,ls6 and judicial denial of individual 
rights combine to preserve the current authority structure of 
133. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, a t  246. 
134. Id. at 213. A Japanese government training manual contained the follow- 
ing statement: 
The organisational climate that makes possible this kind of groupism 
peculiar to our country stems from our national traditions, from the fact 
that our country consists of a homogeneous race, which is rare in the 
world, and from the fact that we go about our lives while mutually grasp- 
ing one another's feelings, fearing confrontation, regarding 'harmony as 
noble,' mutually restraining ourselves, and aligning ourselves to the 
thoughts and actions of people in the group. 
Id. a t  314 (quoting Chiho Jichi Kenkyu Shiryo Sentaa, Gendai Kanrisharon [MOD- 
ERN MANAGEMENT] 22 (1977)). 
135. TANAKA, supra note 11, at  255. Even with the relatively low number of 
cases, it is often difficult for the Japanese to obtain a lawyer because of their 
scarcity, especially in rural areas. ODA, supra note 14, a t  102-03; cf: John 0. 
Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359-90 (1978) 
(asserting that the low level of litigation is a t  least as much the result of insti- 
tutional arrangements as of cultural restraints). 
136. Unfortunately, the veneration of homogeneity can lead to bigotry and in- 
tolerance for those that do not conform to the same cultural, social, and racial ide- 
als. A 1983-84 survey showed that over 80% of the Japanese surveyed felt that 
they were one of the "superior races in the world." William Wetherall, Nakasone 
Promotes Pride and Prejudice, FAR E. ECON. REV., 19 Feb. 1987, at  87. 
This supremacist dynamic also manifests itself in the shockingly racist state- 
ments of some government officials. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, 
addressing the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, stated that "Japan has an 'in- 
telligent society' because 'in America there are many Blacks, Puerto Ricans and M&icans.' 
Id. I t  is also telling that of the fifty-some-odd reporters covering the address, only 
two found this statement worth mentioning in their reports. See VAN WOLFEREN, 
supra note 9, a t  267-68. 
The glorification of Japanese homogeneity has even spurred a new and popular 
genre of literature. Nihonjinron ["theory on what is Japanese"] extols the virtue of 
Japanese uniqueness and often speaks of the superiority of the Japanese race. For 
works addressing this issue, see PETER N. DALE, THE MYTH OF JAPANESE UNIQUE- 
NESS (1986); VAN WOLFEREN, supm note 9, a t  263-72; Paul Lansing & Tamra 
Domeyer, Japan's Attempt a t  Internationalization and Its Lack of Sensitivity to 
Minority Issues, 22 C&. W. IN'i"L L.J. 135 (1991-92); John Lie, The Discriminated 
Fingers: The Rorean Minority in Japan, 38 MONTHLY REV. 17 (1987). 
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Japan.13' Karel Van Wolferen, a scholar of Japanese politics, 
suggests that "if Japan were to use the law as it is used in the 
Western democracies, and as it is supposed to be used under 
the Japanese constitution, the present Japanese authority 
structure would ~ollapse."'~~ 
This problem is compounded because of the foreign origin 
of the present Japanese constitution. As previously discussed, 
the Constitution of Japan is not only a product of Japanese 
scholars and politicians, but also of Ameri~ans. '~~ When the 
Constitution of Japan was accepted by the Japanese Diet, 
many politicians made much of the fact that the new constitu- 
tion was primarily a foreign do~ument . '~  Today, critics of the 
Constitution of Japan rally around this point, demanding that 
many provisions of the new constitution be removed."' How- 
ever overstated this complaint may be, it is clear that many 
modern Japanese legal concepts, including the concept of indi- 
vidual human rights, are of foreign origin. The foreignness of 
modern Japanese law has resulted in an uncomfortable incon- 
gruity between legal and social norms that makes many Japa- 
nese reluctant to abandon cultural expectations in order to 
137. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at  212; see also UPHAM, supra note 132, a t  
205-21. 
138. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, a t  212. 
139. It should be noted that Japan has a strong civil law tradition, stemming 
from its adaptation of German codes in the late 1800s. The Constitution of Japan 
and other legal influences later introduced an overlay of common law in the post- 
World War I1 occupation period. When considering that these legal traditions over- 
lay a considerably older system of social control based on custom and cultural 
sanctions (consisting of shinto and buddhist philosophy, the warrior code 
(bushidou), and other cultural traditions), common law judicial interpretation is 
indeed a "new" idea to the Japanese. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADI'I'ION 1-5 (2d ed. 1985); see also RALPH PIDDINGTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 319-355 (2d ed. 1952) (discussing law and custom in select- 
ed primitive societies and showing that law and custom both serve to maintain so- 
cial control); kR. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCTURE AND FFWMEWORK IN PRIMITIVE 
SOCIETY 205-11 (1965) (introducing the role and nature of social sanctions in cul- 
ture); TANAKA, supra note 11, at 59 (explaining that custom or "customary law" 
(kanshuu hou) may have a strong legal force in modern Japan). 
140. After several amendments, the Constitution of Japan was nearly unani- 
mously accepted by the Japanese Diet. TANAKA, supra note 11, at  665. However 
"many claimed that it was a constitution imported from the United States." Id. 
141. Not surprisingly, restoring the emperor to the position of head of state is 
one of the most common demands. Ultraconservative political groups and other 
dissenters make much of the foreign origin of the Constitution in advancing these 
arguments. See id. a t  665-66. 
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assert legal rights that are not a traditional part of the Japa- 
nese psyche. 142 
Professor Tatsuo Inoue suggests that Japan has "an urgent 
need to heed the voice that calls for increased respect for indi- 
vidual rights."'& Specifically mentioning the Nakaya case, 
Professor Inoue suggests that the court's admonitions of toler- 
ance are evidence of the cultural imperative to  onf form.'^ 
The Justices of the Nakaya court were not the only ones to 
emphasize the need for conformity. Mrs. Nakaya's stance 
proved to be unpopular with much of the Japanese public, and 
she has paid a price for going against the grain of Japanese 
~0c ie ty . l~~  It is unlikely that the court will consider a shift to 
individual rights without a struggle-socially and 
governmentally protected cultural norms will not easily be 
replaced by new ~ a 1 u e s . l ~ ~  
2. Viability of the religious personal right claim 
Social and cultural assumptions clearly played a major role 
in the Nakaya court's decision, but the court's reluctance to ac- 
cept Mrs. Nakaya's free-exercise assertion may also be attribut- 
ed to other, more judicially legitimate, public policy concerns. 
First, the establishment of a "personal religious right" 
might potentially subject the Japanese courts to frivolous 
claims. Permitting individual citizens to bring legal action 
every time the government does something that offends their 
personal religious beliefs could open the proverbial "flood-gates 
142. See id. at  665-68; UPHAM, supra note 132, at  7-16. 
143. Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through 
the Window of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 531. 
144. Yoichi Higuchi, one of the leading constitutional lawyers in Japan, also 
referring to the Nakaya case, suggested that "[mlajority opinions that treat a 
shrine's freedom of religion as equivalent to that of the plaintiff, and require the 
exercise of mutual 'tolerance,' actually give the shrine's rights precedence over 
those of individuals. Higuchi Yoichi, "When Society Is Itself the Tyrant," 35 JAPAN 
Q. 350, 354 (1988). 
145. Much of the anger directed at Mrs. Nakaya has come in the form of let- 
ters. See FIELD, supra note 41, at 134. One letter contained defaced newspaper 
photographs of Mrs. Nakaya, carrying captions such as: 'You are possessed by the 
spirit of death! You are not a woman! You are a human demon on this earth!" Id. 
Typical letters read somewhat like the following: "'If you don't like the verdict, get 
out! Go to a "Christian country," a "foreign country"'; You aren't Jewish by any 
chance are you?'; 'Hairy barbarian!'; 'Get off Japanese soil, unclean thing!'" Id. at  
135, 212. 
146. See UP-, supra note 132, at  205-21 (suggesting that group ideology 
provides the basic framework for the entire Japanese bureaucracy). 
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of litigation." A standard providing that a person has a right 
not to be offended by the religious beliefs or practices of an- 
other is problematic. Professor William Marshall suggests that 
"religious sensibilities . . . do not merit special deference under 
the Constitution [of the United States] and cannot, in any 
event, possibly be shielded from offense in a complex soci- 
ety."14' Because religious beliefs vary widely and often dia- 
metrically oppose each other, it is impossible to allow diverse 
religious beliefs to coexist in a public forum without requiring 
religious adherents to show tolerance and accommodation of 
each other's beliefs. In order to protect the religious interests of 
all Japanese people, there must be some degree of tolerance 
toward the beliefs and practices of others, including the majori- 
ty, even if the result is sometimes painful to individual sensi- 
bilities. 
Second, recognition of Mrs. Nakaya's claim of a personal 
religious right could present overly burdensome administrative 
obstacles for the free exercise of those religions whose practices 
involve prayers or ordinances for members of other reli- 
gions.'" If the court were to recognize a cause of action to en- 
force a personal religious right, i t  might require the express 
permission of family members of the deceased as a prerequisite 
to performing such prayers or ordinances. While the vast ma- 
jority of these religions would comply with such regulations, 
compliance would create an administrative burden that might 
infringe the right of such religions to practice their beliefs or 
fulfill duties they view as religious imperatives. 
Third, the recognition of a personal religious right could 
also foreseeably infiinge on the constitutional rights of those 
religions that proselytize in Japan. If individuals were afforded 
147. William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and 
Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 363 (1990-91). Mr. Marshall suggests 
that because of the problems inherent in standards based on offensiveness, "the 
infusion of an offensiveness component into religion clause jurisprudence is inappro- 
priate and should be eliminated." Id. at  353. He suggests that religious freedoms 
should be treated as freedom of speech is, with minimal regard to the personal 
offense of the listener. 
148. For example, it is the practice of members of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints to perform proxy baptisms in the names of deceased individu- 
als of all religions. Latter-day Saints believe that the proxy baptism may be ac- 
cepted or rejected by the deceased in the afterlife or "spirit world." Thus, the ordi- 
nance differs somewhat from Shinto enshrinement in that it presents an "option" 
for the deceased rather than defining the nature of the deceased through a reli- 
gious title. 
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the right not to have their peaceful religious enjoyment dis- 
turbed by a potentially offensive religious message, the free 
speech rights of those people who share their religions through 
missionary work might be infringed.'" This would have far- 
reaching repercussions on the rights of proselyting religions 
such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Sev- 
enth Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Sokka-Gakkai, and 
many others. 
In any event, any claim to a personal religious right faces a 
difficult road to acceptance. As discussed above, it has been 
suggested that in Japan the need for cultural harmony too 
often comes "at the expense of individual rights."150 While 
constitutional language emphasizes the rights of individuals, 
courts have consistently emphasized the rights of the 
Accordingly, many Japanese would rather deal with 
infringements of their rights than face the social stigmatization 
that often visits those who choose to stand alone in a group 
culture. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the cultural differences between the two countries, 
the current state of religious freedom in Japan appears to have 
some significant similarities to religious freedom in the United 
States. Article Twenty of the Constitution of Japan contains 
clauses analogous to the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause in the United States Constitution. Further- 
more, in hearing only two cases dealing with the issue of reli- 
gious freedom, the Japanese Supreme Court has designed an 
establishment standard not highly dissimilar from its American 
counterpart, the product of a much longer history of scrutiny 
and evolution. 
The Institutional Guarantee in the Constitution of Japan 
serves as an assurance of the separation of religion and state. 
In determining whether government actions violate this clause, 
149. Applicable provisions of the Constitution of Japan include Articles 19 and 
21. Article 19 reads "Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated." 
Article 21 reads "Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and 
all other forms of expression are guaranteed. . . . No censorship shall be main- 
tained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated." KENPOU 
[Constitution] arts. XIX, XXI (Japan). 
150. Dean J. Gibbons, Law and the Group Ethos in Japan, 3 INT'L LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 98, 119 (1990). 
151. Id.; UPHAM, supra note 132, at 205-21. 
N-YA u. JAPAN 
courts must first decide if the actions are religious in nature, 
then determine the extent of the government involvement. The 
Japanese Supreme Court has stated that only activities whose 
effect is to promote, facilitate, accelerate, oppress or intervene 
in a religion are violative of the Constitution. In making this 
determination, courts appear to have substantial freedom to set 
their own standards, but the Nakaya court has specifically 
mentioned that the existence of a secular purpose, the nature 
of the activity, the extent of government entanglement, and the 
evaluation of the public are valid considerations. The Nakaya 
court's second inquiry focuses on the nature and extent of the 
actions of the governmental agency. Nakaya holds that indirect 
government involvement-particularly that which is only cleri- 
cal in nature-is not automatically prohibited by the 
Constitution's Institutional Guarantee. However, courts might 
apply stricter scrutiny to government actions that appear to be 
directly collaborative with private organizations involved in 
religious activities. Finally, it appears that the Japanese Su- 
preme Court will allow slightly more cooperation in religious 
activities from the government than its American counterpart 
will. 
In the end, however, the Nakaya standard would afford 
solid protection to the people of Japan only if the courts are 
aware of the pitfalls inherent in giving great weight and con- 
sideration to the public perception of state activity. The courts 
must be sensitive to the normative effects of acculturation and 
the potential for oppression by a majority religion in order to 
effectively protect the religious freedoms of all of its citizens. 
As for the free exercise of religion, the Japanese Supreme 
Court has stated that there is no legal right to live one's life 
under a quiet and undisturbed religious atmosphere. The court 
has placed a strong emphasis on the need to be tolerant of the 
views of others and appears to be wary of religious freedom 
claims that reach beyond mere protection from religious com- 
pulsion or disadvantage. Because the protection here closely 
parallels that of the Institutional Guarantee, it appears that 
this standard could provide adequate protection of religious 
freedoms. However, the apparent disdain for personal rights 
raises serious questions as to whether a free exercise claim will 
ever be fully recognized by the Japanese Supreme Court. It 
also raises questions as to how much time will pass before 
another individual will be bold enough to assert their religious 
rights before the courts. It is interesting $0 note that this time 
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the brave soul was a seemingly simple widow from rural Ja- 
pan. By asserting her beliefs, Mrs. Nakaya paid a high person- 
al price for going against the cultural norms of Japanese soci- 
ety. However, she has renewed the examination of religion's 
place in Japanese culture. Nakaya was heard a decade after 
Tsu City and the years have again mounted since this most 
recent decision was handed down. Because of Mrs. Nakaya's 
courage, perhaps another decade will not have to pass before 
the discussion is taken up again. 
Eric N. Weeks 
